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Transactional Mediation: Using
Mediators in Deals
by Scott Peppet
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This article addresses whether third-partymediators
could be helpful in deal-making, just as they are in
resolving disputes. It makes a theoretical case for such
use of mediators and presents preliminary evidence
that transactional mediation already is taking place.

judges, and litigants have become inn the last accustomed
twenty years,
lawyers,
meto using
creasingly
diators to help settle legal disputes. The
growing acceptance of mediation in the
litigation context raises a puzzling question, however. Given that transactional
negotiations are in some ways quite similar to dispute resolution, why has there
been no corresponding rise of mediation
in deal-making?
Transactional legal practice can be as
adversarial as litigation. Deals break
down. Communication falters. Relationships sour. Emotions rise. There often are
strong advocates, whether lawyers or clients, on each side in major transactions.
Those advocates frequently take positions and push for advantage. These are
the same bargaining dynamics that can
make a mediator valuable in settling disputes. Why then, don't mediators help
contracting parties as they try to close
deals, just as mediators help litigating
parties reach settlement?
This article analyzes the use of mediators in dispute resolution and in dealmaking. It briefly presents the benefits
of transactional mediation and addresses whether it may be a growth area for
the mediation community.' Some recent
research suggests mediators already are
serving in this capacity, although sporadically. The article discusses reasons
transactional mediation has not been
used more often and provides a rationale
for when and why it may be used effectively.

Overview of Mediators
And Dispute Resolution
To address how transactional mediators may be effective in deal-making, it
is essential to first examine why mediators are used in the litigation context. The
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
community-both scholarly and practical-has said remarkably little about this
matter. Practicing mediators often give
a quick, simple, and somewhat vague response when asked what they do: "We
help parties settle."
As a general matter, however, mediators play four important functions in dispute resolution. As discussed below, mediators can: (1) discover whether settlement is possible; (2) help the parties find
value-creating trades; (3) manage psychological barriers to agreement; and (4)
deal with emotional and relational problems.

Discover if Settlement
Is Possible
A mediator can solicit and compare private information about the parties, their
willingness to settle, their concerns, and
their priorities. A mediator can, for example, confidentially compare a defendant's
offer and a plaintiffs demand to determine if they overlap. A private comparison of this sort may encourage parties to
take more reasonable positions than they
would otherwise, because a confidential
offer or demand sends no signal to the
other side about a party's bottom line.
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Put differently, parties often exaggerate
demands and minimize offers because
they fear exploitation. Each is concerned
that if he or she states a true bottom line,
the other side will take advantage. If both
parties think and act this way, their offers
and demands may never overlap. By creating the possibility of private exchanges,
mediators can help the parties discover
whether settlement is possible, thereby
avoiding deadlock.
Develop Value-Creating

Trades
Mediators also can use their access to
private information to help parties find
value-creating trades. Much has been written about interest-based problem solving
and the promise it offers to disputing parties. 2 Rather than merely fighting over
what a court would do, parties instead can
explore their underlying concerns and priorities to discover whether there are trades
that could make one party better off at a
low cost to the other.
By allocating assets and risks to the person who values or can absorb them most
efficiently, negotiators theoretically "expand the pie." Unfortunately, this does not
always happen. Instead, strategic posturing may limit the parties' abilities to find
value-creating options or trades. By interviewing parties privately to discover interests and search for trades, a mediator may
add value to the parties' negotiations.

Mitigate Psychological
Barriers to Settlement
Mediators can add value by mitigating
the effects of cognitive and social psychological biases and heuristics that can impede settlement. Much work recently has
been done exploring such "behavioral" aspects of negotiation and mediation. 3 In general, mediators can help parties manage
several psychological effects.
Parties often are systematically overconfident in their judgments and beliefs.
Mediators may be able to help them overcome such overconfidence. Similarly, mediators may be able to help parties avoid
"reactively devaluing" each other's proposals merely because they come from an adversary.
Mediators also may be able to help parties overcome a phenomenon referred to
as "loss aversion," which tends to make a
person more willing to gamble to avoid a
sure loss than the same person would risk
to secure a gain. By framing possible solutions in ways that mitigate these psycho-

logical biases, mediators can help parties
to behave more rationally.

Manage Emotional and
Relational Issues
Mediators often manage emotional, relational, and communication problems
among disputing parties. Mediators may
empathize with upset parties or help the
parties empathize with each other. They
may be able to help the parties continue
talking, despite a damaged relationship.
Mediators also may slow down the communication process to add clarity to what
otherwise may be a difficult negotiation.
In summary, mediators serve various
roles. They can use their positions as neutrals to add value through information
gathering and comparison. They also can
use their third-party perspectives to help
identify and manage psychological, emotional, and relational difficulties. These are
some of the functions that have led to the
increasing use of mediators in legal disputes.

Role of Mediators
In Transactions
The legal community tends to assume
that litigation is more adversarial than
transactional work. Nonetheless, any
transactional attorney can provide examples of deals that died prematurely or were
concluded at great cost and aggravation because of adversarial posturing and tensions. This suggests that contract negotiations sometimes present some of the same
barriers to successful resolution that are
found in litigation settlement.
On closer inspection, this is indeed the
case. In each domain, there are incentives
for parties to behave strategically to get
more for their side, psychological barriers
that may get in the way of an agreement,
and emotions that can run high and cause
relations to sour.
Parties may take extreme positions on
deal terms or contract language and, thus,
find themselves in a deadlock. They may
miss value-creating trades that could make
one or both better off They may be mired
in psychological, emotional, and relationship problems. All of this suggests a role
for transactional mediators.

Competitive Business Markets
Discourage Mediation
Deals and disputes differ in important
ways, and it is important not to overdo the
case for transactional mediation. There is
a powerful argumentfor why transaction-
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al mediation is relatively unknown. Deals,
the explanation runs, are concluded in
competitive markets. If party A cannot negotiate satisfactorily with party B, then
party A will move on and do the deal with
party C. This ability to exit negotiations
and turn to the market diminishes the
ability of A, B, or C to be strategic, to posture, and to be adversarial.
In litigation, the parties are stuck with
each other-party A either settles the case
with B or goes to court. This is a "bilateral
monopoly," where neither party can walk
away. As such, it permits strategic or adversarial bargaining.
In transactional negotiations, by contrast, the competitive market should "discipline" adversarial posturing and make
things more civil. Put differently, neither
party in a transaction can price above marginal cost, because doing so would invite
another more competitive party to enter
the negotiation and underbid them.
Seen through this economic lens, deals
and disputes look less similar. Instead, the
following closely-related hypotheses
emerge:
1. Transactions conducted in competitive markets should be less strategic
and adversarial. Thus, mediators
would not be involved in assisting in
such transactions.
2. Transactions conducted in "bilateral
monopoly"-type markets should be
more strategic and adversarial, similar to disputes. It is more likely that
mediators would assist in those transactions.
These hypotheses predict that mediation
will arise in markets that have bargaining
conditions favorable to third-party assistance.
Preliminary Evidence of
TransactionalMediation
Although mediation is not well known
in transactional work, there are some significant exceptions. One context in which
mediators routinely assist parties in trying to form contracts is labor-management
negotiations. Although such negotiations
often are portrayed as "disputes," technically they are deals, albeit special ones. In
labor relations, the parties are trying to create a contract. The presence of a union removes (or greatly weakens) management's
ability to go to the market in search of alternative sources of labor and, thus, the
negotiations are like the bilateral monopoly that is found in litigation. It is no surprise, therefore, that mediators are active
in assisting such parties.
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Similarly, certain markets present clear
bilateral monopolies. One modern example is the sale of Internet domain names.
Suppose Party A holds a domain name and
Party B wishes to purchase it for use by
Party B's new company. There is only one
available seller and (most likely) only one
interested buyer. In such circumstance,
there is great incentive to hold out and bargain hard. Not surprisingly, domain name
transfers have given rise to a fairly complex mediation and dispute resolution system to help buyers and sellers overcome
these problems.4

Survey of Mediators
To find out whether mediators are involved in deal-making, the author conducted a national survey of more than 122
practicing mediators. It was a fairly informal survey in which participants indicated the types of mediations they had conducted over the last several years.
Although the survey is not perfect, and
its results are not necessarily statistically
significant or valid, it is a suggestive first
start. The survey asked mediators about:

(1) the nature oftheir practice; (2) the types
of disputes they typically handle; (3) their
experience level; (4) whether they had ever
mediated in a pre-closing transaction, with
specific examples provided, including real
estate, employment contract formation,
and labor-management; and (5) if they had
been involved in transactional negotiations, details of that experience.
The survey indicated that approximately 39 percent of the mediators had been
involved in transactional mediation. Fortyeight of the 122 mediators surveyed indicated that they had mediated in at least
one transaction. These transactions ranged
in value from $100,000 to $26 million and
included the following examples:
" Assisting with negotiations over the
formation of a partnership of practicing physicians
" The sale of a motorcycle dealership
" The formation of pre-nuptial agreements and domestic partnerships
" Re-allocation of property rights and
governance in a golfing community
" The establishment of a joint venture
between a small business and a Fortune 500 company

* The sale of cable television access
rights
* Formation of a cross-country ski
league
" Creation of a houseboat community
association
" Creation of a joint venture to produce
software
" Negotiations over the terms of a real
estate brokerage contract
" The transfer of control within a closely held software development firm
" The formation of a partnership to own
an airplane (the parties needed to
work out issues as varied as fees and
the placement of stickers on the tail
fin)
" The negotiation of"angel funding" for
a privately held business
" Mergers between two or more corporations.
These examples from the survey seem
to support the two hypotheses laid out
above. Many, even most, of the examples
either have or easily could have bilateral
monopoly characteristics. For example,
the transfer of control within a closely held
software company could involve one sell-
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Since the 1970s, ADR has developed as an
alternative to litigation and a way to relieve stress on the court system. Judges,
academics, and practitioners have seen
mediation as a complement to the established judicial system. This history thus
has connected the modern use of mediation directly to litigation, but not to transactional work.
In addition, the modern ADR movement, like any movement, has had its
counter-cultural tendencies. One of those
tendencies has been to justify itself as a
better alternative than going to court. Although this approach helped to market
mediation early on, it perhaps has resulted in a lack of development of positive justifications for and definitions of the practice. As noted earlier, there has been remarkably little discussion about exactly
how mediators add value above and beyond what negotiating parties can do for
themselves. A close examination of that
question, however, leads naturally to the
realization that mediation might be able
to help negotiators-not just disputants.
Perhaps most important, understanding
of negotiation and dispute resolution have
made possible the sort of analysis summarized in this article. There are two trends
worth highlighting. First, negotiation scholars are turning to various disciplines to advance the understanding of bargaining.
This also is increasingly true in mediation
scholarship. By using economics and psychology, similarities begin to emerge that
previously were obscured.

er and only one potential buyer. In such
circumstances, as already explained, each
party may have incentive to bargain hard
and push for a greater share of the proverbial pie. Given those incentives, it is not
surprising that mediators are beginning
to step in to help.
As expected, the majority of mediators
in the survey (61 percent) did not indicate
involvement in transactional mediations.
The idea of transactional mediation as a
field is new, and there has been little discussion of it to date in mediation literature,
trainings, and conferences. Moreover, as
discussed above, in most markets, it makes
little sense to involve a neutral in dealmaking. Only when a market is highly imperfect-when bilateral monopoly conditions exist, for example-will strategic bargaining make sense and a mediator be
able to add value.

Why Transactional
Mediation Has
Been Limited
Although transactional mediation
makes sense in some contexts, most mediators have never heard of it. Why is this?
First, the ADR movement has several deep
roots, none of which connects to the transactional or deal-making world. The modem ADR movement grew out of the conflict resolution traditions of the Quakers
and other religious groups, many of which
were active in the 1800s and early 1900s.
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Second, negotiation scholars are becoming more interested in deal-making and
transactional bargaining generally. Indeed,
legal scholarship on contracts, corporate
law, mergers and acquisitions, and other
deal-related areas has become more intertwined with negotiation scholarship. It
may be only a matter of time before these
same interests connect to scholarship on
mediation.

Conclusion
It is worth reiterating that transactional mediation is very new. There are no
books to read about it yet, and no seminars
to attend on how to do it. Additionally, not
many mediators are doing such work. Nevertheless, there are strong theoretical and
practical reasons that transactional mediation makes good sense. Both mediators
and transactional lawyers may wish to
consider how ADR can impact transactional work through the use of mediators
and other neutrals during transactional
negotiations.
NOTES
1.This article is based on a longer forthcom-

ing article by the author. See Peppet, "Contract
Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We
Use Mediators in Deals?" to be published in
Ohio State J on DisputeResolution (Feb. 2004).

2. For an in-depth discussion ofvalue creation
in the context of legal negotiations, see Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning:
Negotiatingto Create Value in Deals and Dis-

putes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press,
2000). See also Fisher, Ury, and Patton, Getting
to YES, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books,
1991).
3. For a useful introduction to this field, see
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